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The purpose of this study is to examine the practice of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
Disclosure in a Saudi Arabian context. This study has two particular objectives. Firstly, it 
aims to measure the level of CSR disclosure quantity and quality.  Secondly, it aims to 
investigate the determinants of CSR disclosure quantity and quality in a Saudi Arabian 
context. The study examined a sample of 171 observations from Saudi non-financial listed 
firms covering the period of 2013-2014. In addition, it develops CSR disclosure indices to 
measure the level of quantity and quality of CSR disclosure. The study found that Saudi 
Arabian firms provided higher levels of CSR disclosure quantity; however, the quality of is 
the disclosure was relatively low. In addition, the study found that CSR disclosure quantity 
was positively associated with board size and the size of audit committee. However, it is 
negatively associated with percentage of governmental ownership, and size of remuneration 
committee. On the other hand, the quality of CSR disclosure was positively associated with 
the board size and the percentage of managerial ownership.  However, the study found a 
negative association with the percentage of independent directors. The results suggest that 
Saudi Arabia provides higher levels of CSR disclosure quantity with a lower of CSR 
disclosure quality. In addition, the levels of CSR disclosure quantity and quality have 
different drivers. 
 









1. INTRODUCTION  
This study aims to address two objectives. Firstly, it aims to measures the level of CSR 
disclosure quantity and quality in Saudi Arabian non-financial firms. Secondly, it aims to 
identify the factors that may drive managers of Saudi Arabian firms to provide different 
levels of CSR disclosure quantity and quality.  
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure is considered the main communication tool 
for stakeholders of firms regarding CSR activities (Belal & Cooper, 2011). The last few 
decades have witnessed an increased interest in CSR (Aribi, 2009) .Today, a number of 
stakeholders are demanding social and environmental information, such as information 
related to the environment, society and pollution damage. This information would help 
companies to justify their activities to a wide range of stakeholders by providing a higher 
level of CSR disclosure regarding a number of social and environmental issues, beyond 
simply the economic environment of the firm (Daub, 2007).  
The CSR is considered a fundamental tool used by companies for public relations to 
communicate and create a mutual understanding, managing potential conflicts and providing 
legitimacy to the stakeholders and society as a whole (Golob & Bartlett, 2007). It is 
evidenced that this form of voluntary disclosure has attracted wider interest in research 
studies; however, earlier research highlights some issues relating to the CSR disclosure level 
of the company’s annual report in developed countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia).  
Currently, the CSR is highly recognised across developed countries, it is not an additional 
policy option which firms apply in providing disclosure. ; i.e., companies do not consider the 
CSR disclosure to be a luxury nor do they feel that by providing disclosure it somehow 
enhances their goodwill when dealing with society. However, firms today consider the CSR 
to be a main part of their policies and strategies. Whilst, firms in developing countries are still 
in the early stages of adopting the CSR into their strategies and policies as well as integrating 
it into the firm’s activities. This study - aims to explore the level of CSR disclosure quantity 
and quality in a Saudi Arabia context and will aim to identify the determinants of CSR 
disclosure quantity and quality within Saudi Arabian non-financial listed firms.  
Saudi Arabia is considered as a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It hosts 
many industries such as petrochemicals, - customer services, and cement, refining and 
healthcare. Recently, firms in Saudi Arabia have started to pay much more attention to the 
CSR activities in their annual reports. Furthermore, the Saudi Arabia governance code has 
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considered the disclosure of CSR activities to be part of the required disclosure that should be 
provided by firms. This is in turn provides value relevant information to different 
stakeholders and contributes to the society as a whole. However, there is no guidance 
available in the theoretical and practical frameworks that have examined this phenomenon, 
particularly within the Saudi Arabian context. 
Further, there are several motivations in examining the level of CSR disclosure quantity and 
quality and in identifying the determinants of CSR disclosure in a Saudi Arabian context. 
Firstly, Saudi Arabia established a corporate governance code in 2007; the code was 
significantly affected by the country’s Islamic principles that led to an introduction of Islamic 
characteristics appearing in the governance code. (Albassam, 2014).  
Secondly, Saudi Arabia’s economy is considered huge and it has vast economic prominence 
in the Arab region. In 2010, it represented 25% of the total Arab Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and 44% of the total Arab market capitalisation (Albassam, 2014; Alshehri & 
Solomon, 2012). Furthermore, Saudi Arabia contains a quarter of the world’s oil reserves and 
is considered to be one of the largest oil producers in OPEC. Oil production in 2010 was 
about 31% of the total OPEC production (Albassam, 2014; Habbash et, al. 2015).  
Thirdly, the ownership structure of firms listed in Saudi Arabia is family and state-
concentrated. This means that family owned firms represent more than 70% of the listed 
firms.  In addition, the Saudi government owns more than 30% of the Saudi Arabian firms 
(Albassam, 2014; Baydoun, et al. 2013; ROSC, 2009; Habbash et, al. 2015).  
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, only three studies have previously examined the drivers 
of voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia; namely, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) and Alsaeed (2006) 
and Habbash et al. (2015). This study adds major contributions to research on CSR disclosure 
as the voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia as follows: Firstly, we have used data from more 
wide-ranging and more recently listed non-financial firms covering the period of 2013-2014.  
Whereas Al Janadi et al. (2013), covered the period 2002-2003, Alsaeed (2006), covered the 
period 2006-2007 and Habbash et al. (2015), covered the period 2007-2011.  Secondly, Al-
Janadi et al. (2013) examined the impact of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure, 
whereas Alsaeed (2006), examined the impact of firm characteristics on voluntary disclosure.  
While Habbash et al. (2015), examined the determinants of voluntary disclosure in Saudi 
Arabia. Furthermore, there is limited research in this particular area of investigating CSR 
disclosure in the Saudi firms listed; namely, Abbas et al. (2012) examined the nature of CSR 
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and how this evolving concept took root in an emerging oil- rich country like Saudi Arabia. 
In addition, Mandurah et al. (2012), examined the CSR among Saudi Arabian firms and 
Nalband et al. (2013), examined the CSR perception, practices and performance of listed 
companies of Saudi Arabia.  Consequently, all of them used a qualitative method to 
investigate the CSR disclosure in terms of knowledge, awareness and understanding the 
managers had towards the CSR.  
Our study investigates CSR disclosure level quantity and quality and identifies the 
determinants of the CSR disclosure quantity and quality of non-financial firms listed in Saudi 
Arabia. This study covers 171 observations carried out in various firms during the period of 
2013-2014. All of these factors motivate us to examine the determinants of CSR disclosure in 
Saudi Arabia. In addition, it is argued that the area of voluntary disclosure (in general) is still 
under-researched (Habbash et al., 2015). 
Saudi Arabia provides a unique country context within which the CSR disclosure can be 
analysed. This is because of the following reasons. Firstly, Saudi Arabia is a country with an 
emerging economy. It has different religious, social and political systems as well as traditions, 
which differ from developed countries. For instance, the Islamic principles in Saudi Arabia 
affect the daily life, business, law, economics and political aspects of the whole of Saudi 
society. Secondly, Saudi Arabia enhanced its corporate governance code in 2012; this 
enhanced code requires companies to disclose their CSR activities in their annual reports. In 
addition, this code is affected by the country’s Islamic principles, which resulted in the 
introduction of Islamic governance characteristics (Albassam, 2014). This is in turn may 
affect the level of CSR disclosures of Saudi Arabian firms. 
However, there is limited research that examines the practice of CSR disclosure in 
developing countries as stated in the annual report by Hussainey et al., 2011; Nalband et al., 
(2013). Existing research on the determinants of CSR disclosure in developing countries is 
rare, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, in Saudi Arabia there is a lack of concern 
among regulatory bodies regarding CSR disclosure; this may be because they feel that CSR 
disclosure is not relevant for investors. Therefore, this paper aims to examine the practice of 
CSR in a developing country, particularly Saudi Arabia. 
This study develops two disclosure indices, one for measuring the level of CSR disclosure 
quantity and the other for measuring the level of CSR disclosure quality. It uses samples from 
non-financial firms listed in Saudi Arabia over the period of 2013-2014. This study found 
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that Saudi Arabian firms provide higher levels of CSR disclosure quantity; however, the 
quality of this disclosure is relatively low. In addition, the CSR disclosure quantity is 
positively (negatively) associated with board size, (that is the percentage of governmental 
ownership), the size of the audit committee and (size of remuneration committee). On the 
other hand, the quality of CSR disclosure is positively (negatively) associated with board size, 
(the percentage of independent directors) and by percentage of managerial ownership.   
This study offers the following contributions to the CSR disclosure literature in general and 
corporate governance in particular. Firstly, it introduces a new measure of CSR disclosure 
quantity based on the previous study carried out by Ng, 1995; Hackston & Milne (1996). This 
measure will take the Islamic culture of Saudi Arabia into account  and adds some additional 
factors to the measure of CSR disclosure quantity that are consistent with the Saudi 
environmental, such as The existence of charitable societies that support activities like the 
memorisation of The Holy Quran. (details are included in appendix 1). Secondly, this is the 
first study to measure the CSR disclosure quality based on the qualitative characteristics of 
financial information. Thirdly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine 
the determinants of both the quantity and quality of the CSR disclosure in a Saudi Arabian 
context, as one of the developing countries. Furthermore, it offers evidence that CSR 
disclosure quantity is not a proxy of CSR disclosure quality. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
framework; it draws on the definitions of CSR disclosure quantity and quality and theories. 
Section 3 discusses the research literature and hypothesis development. Section 4 presents the 
research design, Section 5 reports the results and finally, section 6 presents a conclusion. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CSR DISCLOSURE, THEORY, LITERATURE 
AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
This section provides an overview of the CSR disclosure quantity and quality, and introduces 
theories that explain the need for CSR disclosure and summarises the literature and presents 
the research hypothesis.  
  2-1 CSR disclosure: quantity and quality  
CSR is one of the new accounting concepts, that have not only economic and legal 
responsibilities but also social and moral responsibilities to other parties concerned 
(stakeholders), such as customers, employees, communities, investors, governments, 
6 
 
suppliers and even competitors (Anwar et al, 2010). CSR can be defined as actions on the 
part of a firm that appear to further some social good beyond the immediate interests of a 
firm and beyond legal requirements (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). The CSR disclosure is 
considered a key concept in many fields of research, such as quality of life, quality of food 
and quality of service. In some cases, there are conflicts regarding the context and subject of 
the CSR concept (Carroll, 1983).  Accordingly, it is argued that disclosure indices combine 
measures of different dimensions into one single abstract value that has a limited appeal. 
Galbreath (2010) further states that: “CSR comprises the economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary responsibilities firms assume towards their stakeholders”.  
The concept of quality of the CSR disclosure is a debated issue in existing disclosure 
literature. From a business perspective, it is defined as ‘’the extent to which a product or 
service meets user expectations”.  According to ISO 9000, it is defined as the degree to which 
a set of inherent characteristics meet certain requirements. More specifically, the concept of 
disclosure quality reflects the level of disclosure that meets the user’s needs. However, the 
disclosure quality is still debuted to identify the definition and measurements (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Botosan, 1997; Beest and Braam, 2011; Anis et al., 2012).  
2.2 The Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) 
It is stated that the Saudi Corporate Governance Code (SCGC) is considered to be a key 
driver in applying good corporate governance practices across Saudi listed firms (Albassam, 
2014). The code contains many parts, for instance, part three of the SCGC emphasises 
specifically to increase corporate transparency and voluntary disclosure. In addition, this part 
of the code requires inclusion and classification of some of the variables of the code such as 
the board size, executive directors, non-executive directors, independent directors, and CEOs. 
The companies also have to provide information regarding the sizes of their audit and 
remuneration committees as well as information about the meeting of board of directors. The 
SCGC seeks to reduce agency conflicts between mangers and shareholders through 
improving transparency, accountability and responsibility of corporate board of directors 
(ROSC, 2009; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). In addition, the code encourages firms to be 
more socially responsible. Consequently, Article 10 of the code (which covers social 
responsibility), governs to protect other stakeholders such as local communities, employees 
and the environment. 
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2.2 Theories  
     2.2.1 Legitimacy and stakeholder theories  
As stated earlier, the legitimacy and stakeholder theories are used to explain the practice of 
corporate social responsibility; however, the legitimacy theory offers a far superior 
explanation (Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996). According to the legitimacy theory, the CSR 
disclosure aims to legitimise the behaviour of the firm through providing information, which 
is intended to affect the stakeholders and society’s perception about the firms (Hooghiemstra, 
2000). 
The legitimacy theory is closely related to the stakeholder theory. The demand for CSR 
disclosure has been driven by the increasing popularity of stakeholders (Boesso & Kummar, 
2007). Overall, companies can provide the social information in their annual reports to 
enhance the firm’s reputation in the eyes of its stakeholders and to satisfy the community’s 
need (Hassan et al., 2010).   
    2.2.2 Signalling theory  
The signalling theory suggests that mangers of firms are more likely to disclose more 
information in order to signal their favourable results (Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015). 
Accordingly, firms may use CSR disclosure to signal to their investors that they have 
favourable results, which in turn enhance their image in the market (Sun, Salama, Hussainey 
and Habbash, 2010). In addition, the CSR disclosure is a way of signalling to investors and 
other stakeholders that the company is actively taking part in the CSR activities.  Furthermore, 
by participating in the CSR activities it helps the company to establish a good reputation for 
reliability in the capital markets.  
 
    2.2.3 Agency theory  
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308) define the agency relationship as “a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the 
agent”. It is concerned with the problems of information asymmetries in markets (Morris, 
1987). Agency theory suggests that firms may use a compensation plan or provide voluntary 
disclosure to reduce the agency costs. The CSR activities require firms to be more 
accountable to its stakeholders and to the whole of society. This is in turn will divert the 
attention of shareholders from monitoring earning manipulation to other issues, which in turn 
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enhances the share price of the firm. In addition, the CSR activities may help the company to 
retain superior profits in the market. Consequently, this reduces any agency conflict between 
management and its shareholders (Sun, et. al., 2010).  
3- Hypotheses development and literature  
   3-1 Board size  
The agency theory suggests that board size is a potential variable of corporate governance to 
monitoring management performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). 
There are debates about the size of a board of directors. Some prior research argues that the 
board size promotes more effective decision-making and develops information-processing 
capabilities. While on the other hand, others argue that a larger board can be less participating 
between members, in order to increases the opportunity for manipulation (Ho & Williams, 
2003). Healy and Palepu (2001) indicated that by nominating a board of directors, who deed 
on behalf of investors, is an efficient mechanism that affects mangers’ voluntary disclosure 
decisions and controls the agency problem. Ntim et al. (2012a) find that board size is a vital 
determinant of voluntary corporate disclosure. In the context of the expected impact of board 
size on CSR disclosure, Halme & Huse (1997) argued that in a large board, there is a higher 
probability of a broader range of stakeholders, which indicates that a higher level of 
environmental attention can be expected (Halme & Huse, 1997: 142). More specifically, they 
present a positive and significant association between board size and voluntary corporate 
disclosure among 169 South African firms. Furthermore, Albassam (2014) shows that, in the 
Saudi corporate context, the relationship between board size and voluntary corporate 
disclosure is not well documented. For instance, Al-Moataz and Lakhal (2012) find no 
significant relationship between board size and corporate governance practices. In addition, 
other prior research finds a positive relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure 
(e.g., Laksamana, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011). Therefore, based on the above 
discussion, this study hypothesises that: 
H 1 a: There is an association between board size and CSR disclosure quantity. 
H 1 b: There is an association between board size and CSR disclosure quality. 
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   3-2 Independent directors 
The agency theory explains the relationship between the principle and agent (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Bruton et al., 1997). Forker’s (1992) finds a positive association between the 
percentage of outside directors on the boards and the comprehensiveness of financial 
disclosure. Furthermore, others research reports the same results (e.g., Arcay and Vazquez, 
2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Laksamana, 2008). In addition, 
Chen and Jaggi (2000) and Gul and Leung (2004) suggest that a higher number of 
independent directors sitting on a board makes it becomes more effective and consequently 
this board improves the levels of corporate transparency and disclosure. 
On the other hand, further research finds a negative relationship between outside directors 
sitting on the boards and the levels of voluntary disclosure (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako, 
Hancock and Izan, 2006; Hoitash and Bedard, 2009). Others studies find insignificant 
associations between the two variables (e.g., Hoe and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  
Rose (2007, pp. 321) suggests that “reported that new regulations, requiring more 
independent directors, are a major step in improving corporate ethics and social 
responsibility’’. Therefore, an increase in the percentage of independent directors on the 
board encourages companies to deal positively with social pressure and increases the level of 
CSR disclosure. This research attempts to examine the association between CSR disclosure 
and board independence in Saudi listed companies. Therefore, the following research 
hypotheses are developed: 
H 2 a: There is an association between independent directors and CSR disclosure 
quantity. 
H 2 b: There is a relationship between independent directors and CSR disclosure 
quality. 
   3-3 Government ownership 
The stakeholder theory suggests that governmental ownership is a key factor that influences 
on the corporate governance disclosure, particularly, in developing countries like Saudi 
Arabia, which are profoundly building up on the ownership structure (Shleifer, 1998; Cornett 
et al., 2010; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012). Eng and Mak (2003) find that agency 
problems are more likely to increases with ownership size, such as government ownership. In 
addition, is argued that government ownership normally leads to intervention by the 
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government in the running of the firm, which can lead to poor corporate governance practices 
(e.g., Bolton and Thadden, 1998; Konijn et al., 2011). Eng and Mak (2003) have studied the 
association between government ownership and voluntary disclosure using a sample of 158 
firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange in the period of 1995. They find that higher 
government ownership is positively associated with corporate voluntary disclosure. 
Consistently, Conyon and He (2011) they examined a sample of 1342 firms from Chinese 
listed firms during 2001-2005. They find that there is relationship between ownership and 
corporate governance practices. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012a) shows that the government 
ownership is positively associated with voluntary corporate disclosure among 169 South 
African listed firms. The Saudi government has high ownership stakes in a considerable 
number of firms, representing an average of 42% of the total value of the Saudi stock market. 
Apart from Al-Moataz and Lakhal (2012), no study has explored the impact of government 
ownership on CSR disclosure. Based on the above discussion, the current study hypotheses 
the following:   
 
H 3 a: There is an association between Government ownership and CSR disclosure 
quantity. 
H 3 b: There is a relationship between Government ownership and CSR disclosure 
quality.  
   3-4 Managerial ownership 
The agency theory indicates that the increase of managerial ownership levels could be of 
interest to managers and stakeholders, in particular the shareholders. This may be because 
firms with a higher percentage of managerial ownership are likely to align the interests of 
both managers and shareholders and consequently they would have lower agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, a positive association is expected between managerial 
ownership and corporate voluntary disclosure. Prior studies showed a positive association 
between managerial ownership and corporate voluntary disclosure (e.g. Chau and Gray, 2002; 
Jaing and Habib, 2009). In contrast, Eng and Mak (2003) find a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and the quality of corporate disclosures.  
Based on the agency and stakeholder theories, it is anticipated that managers with a high 
interest in the company’s engage could be motivated to extend the level of the quantity and 
quality of CSR disclosures. This conduct would be explained by the manager’s objective to 
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reduce the agency problem (agency theory) and to achieve the vital information the 
stakeholders’ need (stakeholder theory). Thus, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H 4a: There is an association between Managerial ownership and CSR disclosure 
quantity. 
H 4b: There is a relationship between Managerial ownership and CSR disclosure 
quality.    
   3-5 CEO Duality 
Chef executive officer (CEO) duality is considered to be a suitable system for operating a 
company (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012). Particularly, 
when the agents have access to the information, this increases their ability to work towards 
firm welfare (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). In addition, the CEO duality is an important factor 
of corporate governance because of its sensitive nature, due to the association between the 
agents and principles (Davis et al., 1997; Krause et al., 2014). The agency theory suggests 
that CEO could run a firm to achieve the satisfaction of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Chen et al., 2011). Prior research (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Mashayekhi and 
Bazaz, 2008) suggests that the role of CEO duality can offer some opportunities to self-
serving CEOs. This means they have control over board meetings, and therefore, may 
negatively affect the corporate financial performance. Moreover, CEOs attempt to protect 
their reputation and to find ways of improving their chances in the future (Conyon and He, 
2011). Consequently, they attempt to do their best for their firms to acquire more profit and 
increase the value of their firms (Davis et al., 1997; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Siebels and 
Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012). Christensen et al. (2014) find that the separation of the roles of 
CEO and chairman is significantly associated with higher earnings quality among 660 
Australian companies between the periods of 2001 to 2004. in contrast, some previous 
research shows a positive association between CEO duality and a firm’s financial 
performance.  For instance, Brickley et al. (1997) find that CEO duality roles have a positive 
impact on the financial performance of a firm.   Based on the above discussion, the current 
study develops the following hypotheses: 
H 5 a: There is an association between CEO Duality and CSR disclosure quantity. 
H 5 b: There is a relationship between CEO Duality and CSR disclosure quality.     
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   3-6 Board meeting frequency  
The frequent board meeting is an essential tool to a corporate governance mechanism because 
it helps the directors of the board to control operation of the firm effectively. Thus, active and 
frequent meetings of the board can monitor the financial reporting of an entity. Consistently, 
some prior research finds a positive association between board meetings and financial 
reporting of a company. This is also consistent with signalling theory. However, there is 
limited literature that examines the association between frequency of board meetings and 
corporate disclosure in the UK (Alzahar, 2013). Laksamana (2008) reports a positive 
association between board meetings and the transparency of compensation disclosure. Anis, 
et al. (2012) reported that one of the board duties is to oversee management practices; one of 
these practices is the disclosure of voluntary information. Therefore, the higher the frequency 
of meetings, the more effective the board will be, or more specifically, more time will be 
expected to be allocated for overseeing voluntary disclosure and this is consequently 
promoting disclosure quality. In addition, Anis, et al. (2012) finds a positive relationship 
between the frequency of board meetings and the level of disclosure quality. Accordingly, 
with the consensus about the positive influence of board meeting frequency, based on the 
above findings, the current study hypotheses the following: 
H 6 a: There is an association between board meetings and CSR disclosure quantity.  
H 6 b: There is a relationship between board meetings and CSR disclosure quality.     
   3-7 Audit committee size 
The audit committee has an essential role in improving disclosure levels of financial reports 
(Al Janadi et al., 2013). The agency theory plays a role to explain the problem between the 
principal and the agent (Bruton et al., 1997). However, there is limited research to study the 
association between voluntary disclosure and the audit committee. In addition, some research 
argues that the audit committee is considered to be the monitoring tool, which improves the 
quality of corporate disclosure, which in turn reduces the agency costs. Furthermore, Hoe and 
Wong (2001) report that the existence of an audit committee significantly affects the level of 
corporate disclosure. Moreover, small audit committees may not be in a position to have 
enough resources. Consequently, this may adversely affect the quality of their oversight (Fleo 
et al., 2009). In addition, organisational behaviour research maintains that large audit 
committees are likely to be less productive (Jensen, 1993; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005).  
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Some previous research (Li, Pike and Haniffa, 2008: O’Sullivan, Percy, and Stewart, 2008) 
reports that a positive association exists between the audit committee size and the levels of 
voluntary disclosure. Similarly, another study finds a positive relationship between the audit 
committee size and corporate reporting (Albassam, 2014). Therefore, the following 
hypotheses are formulated as follows: 
H 7 a: There is an association between audit committee size and CSR disclosure 
quantity. 
H 7 b: There is a relationship between audit committee size and CSR disclosure quality.  
   3-8 Remuneration committee size  
One of the corporate governance mechanisms is the remuneration committee size. However, 
there is no theory, nor a well-acknowledged argument that explains the association between 
the number of members of a remuneration committee and the quality of disclosure (Anis et al., 
2012). Prior research suggests that there is insignificant relationship between remuneration 
committee size and disclosure quality. This is because it is indicated that 6% of the sample 
falls less than the governance code of (2008)
1
, which requires the size of the remuneration 
committee to consist of at least three members. The governance code (2008) holds that “The 
board should establish an audit committee of at least three or in the case of smaller 
companies’ two, independent non-executive directors” (FRC, 2008; para C.3.1). Moreover, 
prior research that examines the association between the size of the remuneration committee 
and voluntary disclosure is limited. It finds no significant relationship between the 
remuneration committee size and the quality of disclosure. However, it is argued that it might 
be likely that a higher committee size may positively affect the level of quality of disclosure 
(Anis et al., 2012). Although of Anis et al., (2012) argument, there is no strong evidence 
regarding the association between the remuneration committee and disclosure quality. 
Obviously, it is argued that there is little evidence about the effectiveness of remuneration 
committees in the UK (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997). Therefore, based on the above 
discussion, the current study develops the following hypotheses: 
H 8 a: There is an association between remuneration committee size and CSR disclosure 
quantity. 
H 8 b: There is a relationship between remuneration committee size and CSR disclosure 
quality.   
                                                          
1 This is the same governance code applied to companies in Saudi Arabia. 
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   3-9 Auditor type 
Prior research suggests that the quality of the auditor is an important factor in improving the 
firms’ overall reporting practices (e.g. Hail, 2002; Hussainey et al. 2011; Hassanein and 
Hussainey, 2015). Additionally, it is anticipated that big auditing firms are more likely to 
facilitate the diffusion of innovative practices, such as CSR disclosure (Xiao et al., 2004). 
However, previous studies reports mixed results in terms of the association between 
disclosure and audit type (e.g. Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Raffournier, 1995; Xiao et al., 
2004). They find a positive relationship between auditor type and disclosure of voluntary 
information. In addition, some prior research finds a positive relationship between auditor 
type and voluntary disclosure (e.g., Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003); Hossain et al., 1995; 
Wallace et al., 1994).  
Samaha and Dahawy (2011) and Aly et al. (2010) find no association between the disclosure 
of CSR information and auditor type in the Egyptian context. They examine the association 
between auditor type and the overall disclosure quality in order to improve the quality and to 
provide accurate information that it enhances the stakeholder’s decision. It is essential to the 
stakeholders to be concerned with specific social and environmental aspects of performance 
(Adams, 2002). Therefore, this study develops the following hypotheses: 
H 9 a: There is association between auditor type and CSR disclosure quantity. 
H 9 b: there is relationship between auditor type and CSR disclosure quality. 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN  
4.1 Sample   
This study uses samples from the annual reports of Saudi Arabian firms listed in the Tadawul 
Stock Exchange over the period of 2013-2014. This period is chosen because it is quite close 
to the declaration of the Saudi governance code that includes the social contribution. 
Furthermore, it is the most recent annual report containing enhanced quality and quantity 
CSR and its impact is expected given that the code has been adopted since 2010. In addition, 
non-financial companies are more likely to be utilised with social and environments 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). 
The total number of non-financial companies listed in Saudi Stock Exchange for years 2013-
2014 is 198. Following prior research (e.g., Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015; Elshandidy, 
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Fraser, and Hussainey, 2013; Elzahar et al., 2015) financial firms are excluded.  In addition, 
we have excluded firms with missing financial data. This leaves us with 171 firm-year 
observations. Table (1) shows the final sample sorted by industries.  
                                    
Table 1: Industry Classification  
Industry  N % 
Basic material  28 16.4% 
Consumer goods  27 15.8% 
Consumer services  35 20.5% 
Industrials 66 38.6% 
Real Estate  4 2.3% 
Telecommunication  7 4.1% 
Utilities  4 2.3% 
Total  171 100% 
This Table provides the distribution of industries of the sample. The definitions of the 
industries are based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
 
Annual reports are collected from companies' official websites. Governance data is 
manually collected from the companies' annual reports. All financial data is collected 
from DataStream.  
4.2 CSR disclosure index 
This study develops two disclosure indices, one to measure the level of CSR 
disclosure quantity, and the other to measure the level of CSR disclosure quality. The 
disclosure index of CSR disclosure quantity is based on prior research (e.g., Hackston & 
Milne, 1996); Hall, 2002; Newson & Deegan, 2002). This index consists of seven disclosure 
categories, which are: 1) employees, 2) communities, 3) environmental issues, 4) products 
and services, 5) energy, 6) customers, and 7) other disclosure items, which are consistent and 
compatible with the Saudi Arabia culture and its economic environment. In determining the 
CSR disclosure quantity, an unweighted disclosure is commonly utilised. This approach has 
been adopted by several researchers in which an item scores one if it is disclosed and zero if 
it is not disclosed (Abdurouf, 2011; Haji, 2013; Aribi and Gao, 2010; Anwar et al., 2010). 
Appendix 1 details the disclosure index for CSR disclosure quantity.  
In terms of the index that measures CSR disclosure quality, it is based on the qualitative 
characteristics of accounting information suggested in the conceptual framework of the 
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International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Following prior research (e.g., Botosan, 
2004; Jonas and Blanchet, 2000); Beest et al., 2009), this study develops a disclosure index to 
measure the level of CSR quality based on the qualitative characteristics of information 
discussed in the conceptual frameworks. In addition, Beest et al. (2009) develop a 
comprehensive measure to operationalize and to enhance the qualitative characteristic of 
annual reports’ information.  
Following Beest et al. (2009), Chakroun and Hussainey (2014), this study measures the level 
of quality of CSR disclosure in Saudi Arabian firms weighted based on the qualitative 
characteristics of the financial information. Consequently, the study adopted 4themes 
(characteristics) which are “Relevance”, “Faithful representation”, “Understandability” and 
“Comparability2” to assess the level of quality of CSR disclosure in the annual report. This 
allows for the evaluation of the qualitative characteristics of financial information by 
weighted measure as provided in earlier studies (Beest et al., 2009; Chakroun & Hussainey, 
2014).  The study adopted the four qualitative characteristics of CSR information: “relevance,” 
“faithful representation,” “understandability” and “comparability 3 ” to assess the CSR 
disclosure quality in Annual Reports. The reliability and validity of our disclosure scores are 
checked by comparing the correlation between the scores produced by the first author with 
those produced by the second author for a sample of annual reports.  Appendix 2 details the 
disclosure index for CSR disclosure quality.  
Prior research (e.g., Milne and Adler, 1999; Haji, 2013; Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015) 
suggest that the researchers should pay attention to the reliability and validity of their 
disclosure indices. Consequently, the CSR disclosure indices of the quantity and quality have 
been tested for reliability and validity.  
The checklists were improved through revising the draft twice before making it final, to 
enhance the criterion and content validity. Accordingly, we ensured that the draft of the CSR 
disclosure indices were discussed in BAFA conferences, where comments were received 
from experienced researchers in the field of CSR. Following previous studies (e.g. Ng 1995; 
Abdurouf 2011; Haji 2013) after designing the initial checklist, it was reviewed 
independently by both the principal and the second supervisor in order to achieve instrument 
                                                          
 
3 Definition of each characteristic is included in Appendix 2. 
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validity. All suggestions and comments were discussed and considered in order to improve 
the validity of the instrument.  
Further, following prior research (e.g., Botosan, 1997) we use analytical analysis to check the 
validity of the CSR disclosure score. This is done by examining the association between CSR 
disclosure scores (quantity and quality) and the firm characteristics. Further, in the empirical 
results in section (4), the study finds that CSR disclosure quantity is positively associated 
with board size, audit committee size, company size, and negatively associated with 
governmental ownership, remuneration committee size, firm leverage and dividends paid.  In 
addition, the CSR disclosure quality is positively associated with board size, managerial 
ownership, firm size and firm leverage and negatively associated with independent directors 
and dividends paid. These results add validity to our disclosure indices (quantity and quality).   
This study ensures the reliability of the disclosure indices (quantity and quality) in the 
following way. Following the previous research (e.g. Linsley and Shrives, 2006), decision 
rules were produced and used as a coding reference to improve the reliability. Then, the 
researcher and the two supervisors coded the annual reports of the sample in the pilot study, 
independently. This procedure aimed to ensure consistency in applying the checklist of CSR 
disclosure based on the qualitative characteristics to measure the CSR disclosure quality. 
Finally, the results obtained were checked, and found to be close. 
4.3 Regression model 
To test the hypotheses related to the association between CSR disclosure quantity and 
governance mechanisms (H1a, H2a, H3a, H4a, H5a, H6a, H7a, H8a and H9a), the study 
controls for some firm specific characteristics that are identified in prior research as 
determinants of CSR disclosure. These variables are firm profitability, size, liquidity, 
leverage and dividends. Moreover, the CSR disclosure may be affected by the 
implementation of some accounting regulations or may be affected by some industry specific 
characteristics. Therefore, the year and industry fixed effects are used to control for variations 
in CSR disclosures due to this reason.  Equation (1) summarises the empirical model.   
CSRQuan = β0+β1BSIZE+β2 INDTO+β3 GOVWN +β4 MANOW +β5 CEOD +β6 BMET 
+ β7 ACZISE +β8 REMCOSZE +β9 AUDYPE + β10 PROF + β11 SIZE + β12 LIQ + β13 




CSRQuan is the quantity of CSR disclosure, BSZE is the total number of 
directors on the board; INDTO is the number of independent directors in the firm 
board of directors, GOVWN Percentage of shares owned by government, 
MANOW is the aggregate percentage of shares held by major shareholders (with 
at least 3% ownership), CEOD  is a dummy variable equals 1 if the chairman is 
the same person as the CEO of the firm, 0 otherwise  BMET is the total number 
of board meetings during the year; ACSZE is the is the total number of directors 
in audit committee; REMCOSZE is the number of members of the firm 
remuneration committee, AUDYPE is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the 
firm is audited by one of the big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise. PROF is firm 
profitability, measured using returns on the assets ratio; SIZE is the firm size, 
measured using the value of total assets; LIQ is firm liquidity, measured using 
the current ratio (current assets / current liabilities); LEV is firm leverage, 
measured using the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, DIVI is the total 
dividends paid to common shareholders.  
 
Consistently, to test the hypotheses related to the association between CSR disclosure quality 
and governance mechanisms (H1b, H2b, H3b, H4b, H5b, H6b, H7b, H8b and H9b), the study 
controls for some firm specific characteristics that have been identified in prior research as 
determinants of CSR disclosure. These variables are firm profitability, size, liquidity, 
leverage and dividends. Besides, the CSR disclosure may be affected by the implementation 
of some accounting regulations or may be affected because of some industry specific 
characteristics. Therefore, the year and industry fixed effects are used to control for variations 
in CSR disclosures due to this reason. Equation (2) summarises the empirical model.   
CSRQual = β0+β1BSIZE+β2 INDTO+β3 GOVWN +β4 MANOW +β5 CEOD +β6 BMET 
+ β7 ACZISE +β8 REMCOSZE +β9 AUDYPE +   β10 PROF + β11 SIZE + β12 LIQ + β13 
LEV+ β14 DIVI + Year Fixed Effect + Industry Fixed Effect                               (2)                               
Where: 
CSRQual is the quality of CSR disclosure; BSZE is the total number of directors 
on the board; INDTO is the number of independent directors in the firm board of 
directors, GOVWN is the percentage of shares owned by government, MANOW 
is the aggregate percentage of shares held by major shareholders (with at least 3% 
ownership), CEOD  a dummy variable, equals 1 if the chairman is the same 
person as the CEO of the firm, 0 otherwise  BMET is the total number of board 
meetings during the year; ACSZE is the total number of directors in audit 
committee; REMCOSZE is the number of members in the  firm remuneration 
committee, AUDYPE Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is audited by 
one of the big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise. PROF is firm profitability, 
measured using returns on the assets ratio; SIZE is the firm size, measured using 
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the value of total assets; LIQ is firm liquidity, measured using the current ratio 
(current assets / current liabilities); LEV is firm leverage, measured using the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets, DIVI is the total dividends paid to common 
shareholders. 
5- RESULT ANALYSIS  
5.1 Descriptive statistics: 
Table (4.2) details the descriptive statistics of all variables. The mean value of the CSR 
disclosure quantity (CSRQuan) is 9.433 (.334), which reveals that the value of the CSR 
disclosure quantity in Saudi Arabian firms is higher than the value of the CSR disclosure 
quality. In addition, the minimum and maximum values of the CSR disclosure quantity range 
from .000 to 51.00 respectively. However, the minimum and maximum values of the CSR 
disclosure quality range from 1.00 to 1.3 respectively. 
In terms of governance mechanisms, the mean value of board size (BSZE) is 8.485 with a 
minimum value of 4.0 and a maximum value of 12.0. This means that the board size of Saudi 
Arabian firms ranges from four members on the board to twelve members. The mean value of 
the percentage of independent directors (INDTOR) on the board is 4.064 with a minimum 
value of 0.00 and a maximum value of 11.0.  In terms of ownership structure, the mean value 
of governmental ownership (GOVWN) is .032 and minimum and maximum values are .000 
and 0.743, respectively. In addition, the mean value of managerial ownership (MANOWR) 
is .055 and the minimum is .000 whilst the maximum is 0.700.  The mean value of the role 
duality of CEO (CEOD) is .357 with a minimum value of .000 and a maximum value of 1.0. 
The mean value of board meeting (BMET) is 5.292; whereas, the minimum value is 0.000, 
and the maximum value is 16.0. The audit committee size (ACSZE) of Saudi Arabian firms 
has a mean value of 3.316 and its minimum value is .000 and its maximum value is 6.0.  
Furthermore, the mean value of remuneration committee size (REMUCOSZE) is 3.368 and 
the minimum value is .000 and the maximum value is 7.0. Finally, the auditor type 
(AUDYPE) has a mean value of .632 with minimum and maximum values of.000 and 1.0, 
respectively. 
With regards to firm characteristics, the mean value of firm profitability (PROF) is 13.242 
with a minimum value of -60.94 and a maximum value of 59.410. Firm size (SIZE), has a 
minimum value of 11.268, a maximum value of 19.643, and a mean value of 14.720. Firm 
liquidity (LIQ) has minimum and maximum values of .070 and 5.770, respectively. Firm 
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leverage (LEV) has a minimum value of .000 and a maximum value of 354.910, with a mean 
value of 57.961. The dividends paid (DIVI0 have a mean value of 493507 and the minimum 




























Table (4.2): Sample descriptive statistics 
 




CSRQuan 171 9.433 9.517 .000 2.000 6.000 15.000 51.0 
CSRQual 171 .334 .141 .100 .20000 .325 .425 1.300 
BSZE 
171 8.485 1.606 4.0 7.000 9.000 9.000 12.0 
INDTOR 
171 4.064 1.587 .000 3.000 4.000 5.000 11.0 
GOVWN 
171 .032 .134 .000 .000 .000 .000 .7431 
MANOWR 
171 .055 .126 .000 .000 .000 .045 .7000 
CEOD 
171 .357 .480 .000 .000 .000 1.000 1.0 
BMET 
171 5.292 2.323 .000 4.000 5.000 6.000 16.0 
ACSZE 
171 3.316 .929 .000 3.000 3.000 4.000 6.0 
REMUCOSZE 
171 3.368 1.067 .000 3.000 3.000 4.000 7.0 
AUDYPE 
171 .632 .483 .000 .000 1.000 1.000 1.0 
PROF 
171 13.242 15.597 -60.94 .000 13.010 20.570 59.410 
SIZE 
171 14.720 1.622 11.268 13.80 14.551 15.280 19.643 
LIQ 
171 1.393 1.275 .070 .480 .960 1.770 5.770 
LEV 





1858755 .000 23.000 65000 306000 18502401 
CSRQuan refers to the quantity of CSR disclosure; CSRQual is the quality of CSR disclosure; BSZE is the total number of 
directors on the board; INDTO is the number of independent directors in the firm board of directors, GOVWN is the percentage of 
shares owned by government, MANOW is the aggregate percentage of shares held by major shareholders (with at least 3% 
ownership), CEOD  is a dummy variable equals 1 if the chairman is the same person as the CEO of the firm, 0 otherwise  BMET is 
the total number of board meetings during the year; ACSZE is the is the total number of directors in audit committee; REMCOSZE 
is the number of members in the  firm remuneration committee, AUDYPE is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is audited 
by one of the big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise, PROF is firm profitability, measured using returns on the assets ratio; SIZE is the 
firm size, measured using the value of total assets; LIQ is firm liquidity, measured using the current ratio (current assets / current 
liabilities); LEV is firm leverage, measured using the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, DIVI is the total dividends paid to 
common shareholders. 
This table provides the descriptive statistics of CSR disclosure quantity and quality, in addition to explanatory variables. 
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5.2 Correlation analysis 
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), high correlation among variables might cause a 
problem of multi-collinearity
4
.  If there is problem of multi-collinearity the reliability of the 
estimates is affected (Acock, 2008). Moreover, the problem of multi-collinearity might cause 
a problem in terms of evaluating the significance variables in regression. Therefore, it is 
required to match the aggregate correlation among all the independent variables (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007). 
The Pearson correlation matrix is a basic tool to detect the multi-collinearity problem. 
Gujarati and Porter (2009) pointed that variables have a high correlation if the correlation is 
bigger than 0.80. Therefore, multi-collinearity among variables is accepted if the correlation 
coefficients are less than 0.80.  
Table (4.3) shows the Pearson correlation matrix among all the independent and dependent 
variables used in this study. Pearson coefficients are relatively low among all variables, less 
than 0 .80, indicating that there is no multi-collinearity problem.   
An additional check for multi-collinearity is performed by calculating the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) after each regression model. Prior research indicates that if the VIF value is 
more than 10, thus, this suggests a multi-collinearity problem. The mean and maximum 
values of the VIF tests are tabulated with the regression result and show that there is no 
concern about this problem (Field, 2009).    
The Pearson correlation matrix is also used to measure the strength and direction of the linear 
relationship between two variables. It provides evidence that CSRD quantity is statistically 
correlated positively with some corporate governance variables such as BSZE at .182 (10% 
significance level), CEOD at .191 (10% significance level), ACSZE .173 (10% significance 
level), and with firm characteristics such as firm size at .273 (5% significance level), 
dividends paid at .287 (5% significance level). However, the CSR disclosure quality is 
associated positively with board size at .155 (10% significance level), managerial ownership 
at .216 (5% significance level) and with firm characteristics such as firm size at .206 (5% 
significance level) and dividend paid at .292 (10% significance level).  
                                                          
4 Multi-collinearity (also, multicolinearity or colinearity) exists when two or more variables are highly 




Moreover, the Pearson correlation matrix indicates significant association between CSR 
disclosure quantity and quality with some firm characteristics variables. This study finds that 
there is a positive relationship between CSR disclosure quantity and  quality, which are both 
significantly correlated with firm size and dividend paid respectively .206,  .292 (5% 
significance level). 
This result is consistent with some prior research (e.g. Laksamana, 2008; Hussainey and Al-
Najjar, 2011) who suggest that the corporate governance variables are associated with firm 
disclosure. Regarding previous research, the firm characteristics results by Wang and 






























































































N 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
CSRQuan 
1 .605** .182* .001 .079 .021 .191* .063 .173* .000 .068 .135 .273** -.095 -0.08 .287** 
 .000 .017 .991 .301 .788 .012 .414 .024 .996 .377 .077 .000 .216 .914 .000 
CSRQual. 
 1 .155* -.095 .072 .216** .079 -.036 .107 .042 .103 .078 .206** -.099 .017 .292** 
  .043 .217 .351 .004 .301 .639 .166 .587 .181 .312 .825 .196 .007 .000 
BSZE 
  1 .352** .089 -.020 .049 .047 .165* .286** .216** .136 .392** .081 -.004 .088 
   .000 .245 .798 .527 .543 .031 .000 .004 .076 .000 .291 .956 .253 
INDTO 
   1 -.099 .049 -.038 .011 .062 -.018 -.092 .054 .046 -.074 -.066 -.087 
    .200 .525 .622 .888 .421 .820 .234 .480 .546 .339 .390 .257 
GOVWN 
    1 -.107 -.022 .119 .278** .254** .185* -.104 .459** .22* -.030 .495** 
     .163 .771 .122 .000 .001 .015 .177 .000 .003 .701 .000 
MANOW 
     1 -.050 -.155* -.098 -.089 .023 .179* -.070 -.069 -.064 -.070 
      .514 .043 .202 .246 .767 .019 .362 .369 .408 .365 
CEOD 
      1 -.073 .062 -.017 .037 .149 .037 -.147 -.033 .177* 
       .343 .418 .826 .628 .052 .630 .055 .670 .021 
BMET 
       1 .172* .189* .013 .007 .156* -.073 -.113 .158* 
        .024 .013 .869 .925 .042 .346 .143 .040 
ACSZE 
        1 .635** .064 .018 .307** .121 .001 .216** 
         .000 .406 .815 .000 .116 .986 .004 
REMCOSZE 
         1 .128 .121 .253** .090 -.021 .249** 
          .096 .115 .001 .241 .786 .001 
AUDYPE 
          1 .123 .291** .165 -.029 .154* 
           .109 .000 .031 .705 .044 
PROF 
           1 .034 -.273 .124 .117 
            .663 .000 .107 .128 













             .000 .210 .111 
LIQ 
             1 .498 -.060 
              .000 .437 
LEV 
              1 .482 
               .000 
DIVI 
               1 
                
CSRQuan refers to the quantity of CSR disclosure; CSRQual is the quality of CSR disclosure; BSZE is the total number of directors on the board; INDTO is the number of 
independent directors in the firm board of directors, GOVWN is the percentage of shares owned by government, MANOW is the aggregate percentage of shares held by major 
shareholders (with at least 3% ownership), CEOD  a dummy variable equals 1 if the chairman is the same person as the CEO of the firm, 0 otherwise  BMET is the total number of 
board meetings during the year; ACSZE is the total number of directors in an audit committee; REMCOSZE is the number of members of the  firm remuneration committee, AUDYPE 
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the largest four audit firms and 0 otherwise, PROF is firm profitability, measured using returns on the assets ratio; 
SIZE is the firm size, measured using the value of total assets; LIQ is firm liquidity, measured using the current ratio (current assets / current liabilities); LEV is firm leverage, measured 
using the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, DIVI is the total dividends paid to common shareholders. 
This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix among all variables  
***, **, * indicate significance at .01, .05 & .1 level. 
26 
 
5.3 Regression analysis 
Table (4.4) summarises the results of OLS regression analysis of the relationship between 
CSR disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms. Panel A reports the results of the 
CSR disclosure quantity (Model 1), while, panel B reports the results of the CSR disclosure 
quality (Model 2). It is apparent that the F-values of Models 1 and 2 are 5.800 (1 % 
significance level) and 2.564 at (1% significance level) respectively. These values indicate 
that both models 1 and 2 are statistically significant. Moreover, the adjusted R-Squared 
values of models 1 and 2 are .37.2% and 16% respectively. These values imply that model 1 
explains 37 % of total variation in CSR disclosure quantity and model 2 explains 16% of the 
CSR disclosure quality. In sum, both models 1 and 2 are statistically effective for explaining 
the variation in the extant of CSR disclosure quantity and quality. Overall, their values imply 
a good overall fit of the models. 
The coefficient for CSRQuan on BSZE is .826 and is statistically significant at 10% level of 
significance. This result indicates that CSR quantity is positively associated with -board size. 
In other words, the result suggests that the quantity of CSR disclosure increases as long as 
board size increases. Therefore, the researcher accepts the H1a hypothesis that an association 
exists between CSR disclosure quantity and board size. In addition, it finds that the 
coefficient for CSRQual on the BSZE is .016 and is statistically at 10% level of significance. 
This result indicates that CSR disclosure quality is positively associated with board size, 
meaning that the quality of CSR disclosure quality increases as long as the size of the board 
of directors increases.  Therefore, the researcher accepts H1b that an association exists 
between CSR disclosure quality and board size. 
The results are consistent with the expectations of the agency and signaling theories. 
Shareholders of a firm expect a high level and quality of disclosure from the board of 
directors, as they have been selected to represent their interests (Davidson et al., 1998). In 
addition, the agency theory proposes that board size is a crucial factor in monitoring 
management behavior (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Furthermore, 
based on the signaling theory, a positive association between board size and voluntary 
disclosure is expected.  
The results are also consistent with prior research (e.g., Brammer & Pavelin, 2006 and 2008; 
Laksamana, 2008; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011, Schiehll et al. 2013) who find a positive 
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association between voluntary disclosure and board size. However, some prior research 
provides a negative relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure (e.g. Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti, 2007). Others find there to be no significant impact in terms of board size on 
corporate disclosure (e.g. Lakhal, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006).   
The coefficient of CSRQuan on INDTOR is -.367 and is not statistically significant at any 
level of significance. This result indicates that the CSR disclosure quantity is not significantly 
associated with the percentage of independent directors. Therefore, the researcher rejected the 
H2a hypothesis that an association exists between the CSR disclosure quantity and 
independent directors. On the other hand, the coefficient of CSRQual on INDTOR is -.015 
and is statistically at 5% level of significance. This result indicates that the CSR quality is 
negatively associated with the percentage of independent directors, meaning that the 
existence of independent directors on the board of directors decreases the quality of the CSR 
disclosure. Therefore, the H2b hypothesis is accepted in that an association exists between 
the CSR disclosure quality and the percentage of independent directors.  
The results could be explained according to the agency theory and some prior research. Beak 
et al. (2009) study established a positive association between the amount of outside directors 
on boards and the comprehensiveness of financial disclosure. In addition, some -studies finds 
a negative association between outside directors on the boards and the levels of voluntary 
disclosure (Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006; Hoitash and Bedard, 2009). Other studies find 
no association between the CSR disclosure and independent directors (e.g. Hoe and Wong, 
2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  
 This study finds that the coefficient for CSRQuan on GOVWN is -.16.5 and is statistically 
significant at 5% level of significance. This result indicates that the CSR disclosure quantity 
is negatively associated with governmental ownership, meaning that the quantity of the CSR 
disclosure is reduced when governmental ownership exists. Therefore, the H3a hypothesis is 
accepted. On the other hand, the coefficient of CSRQual on GOVWN is -.168 and is not 
statistically significant at any level of significance. This result suggests that there is no impact 
of governmental ownership on the CSR disclosure quality. Therefore, the H3b hypothesis is 
rejected.  
From a stakeholder theory perspective, state (government) ownership is a key factor 
influencing corporate governance disclosure; particularly in emerging countries where 
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concentrated ownership structures are widespread (Shleifer, 1998; Cornett et al., 2010; Al-
Moataz and Hussainey, 2012). Some prior research finds that a positive relationship exists 
between governmental ownership and voluntary disclosure (Baek at el. 2009; Makhija and 
Patton, 2004). However, the result is consistent with prior research (e.g., Liu et al. 2014; 
Barth at el. 1999; Similarly, Luo et al. 2006) who find a negative association between 
voluntary disclosure and governmental ownership.  
The coefficient for CSRQuan on MANOWR is -1.77 and is not statistically significant at any 
level of significance. This result indicates that the percentage of managerial ownership has no 
effect on the level of the CSR disclosure quantity. Therefore, the researcher rejects the H4a 
hypothesis that an association exists between the CSR disclosure quantity and managerial 
ownership. However, the coefficient of CSRQual on MANOWR is .233 and is statistically 
significant at 10% level of significance. This suggests that the CSR disclosure quality 
increases as long as the percentage of managerial ownership increases. Therefore, the 
researcher accepted the H4b hypothesis. 
According to the agency theory, firms with a higher level of managerial ownership would 
align the interests of managers and shareholders, and hence may have lower agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, a positive association is expected between managerial 
ownership and voluntary disclosure. However, the findings of previous research into this 
relationship are mixed. Nevertheless, the result is consistent with prior research (e.g., Chau 
and Gray, 2002; Jaing and Habib, 2009; Wang and Hussainey, 2013) who find that a positive 
association exists between voluntary disclosure and managerial ownership.  In contrast, Eng 
and Mak (2003) reported a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the 
quality of corporate disclosures.   
The study finds that the coefficient for CSRQuant on ACSZE is 1.617 and is statistically 
significant at 10% level of significance. This result indicates that the quantity of the CSR 
disclosure rises when the audit committee size increases. Therefore, the researcher accepted 
the H7a hypothesis that an association exists between CSR disclosure quantity and audit 
committee size. On the other hand, the coefficient of CSRQual on ACSZE is .015 and is not 
statistically significant at any level of significance. This result indicates that the CSR 
disclosure quality is not associated with the audit committee size. Therefore, the researcher 
rejects the H7b hypothesis that an association exists between the CSR disclosure quality and 
audit committee size. 
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The agency theory suggests that firms with a good audit committee will give higher 
disclosure of information in order to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry. In 
addition, CSR disclosure is another means of mitigating the agency problem, where managers 
disclose more CSR information to reduce the agency costs (Barako et al. 2006) as well as  to 
convince the external users that managers are acting in an optimal way (Watson et al., 2002). 
In addition, this result is also consistent with the signaling theory, which indicates that firms 
disclose CSR information in order to reduce the information asymmetry problem and to 
signal their favorable results to - investors (Oyeler et al., 2003). The results are also 
consistent with some previous research on voluntary disclosure. For instance, (O’Sullivan et 
al. 2008; Fleo et al. 2009 Li et al. 2012) find a positive association between the disclosure of 
voluntary information and the audit committee. 
 The study finds that the coefficient for CSRQuan on REMUCOSZE is -2.494 and is 
statistically significant at 1% level of significance. This result indicates that the CSR 
disclosure quantity is negatively associated with the remuneration committee, meaning that 
the quantity of the CSR disclosure reduces when the size of the remuneration committee 
increases. Therefore, the researcher accepted the H8a hypothesis that an association exists 
between the CSR disclosure quantity and remuneration committee. Conversely, the 
coefficient of CSRQual on REMUCOSZE is -.019 and is not statically significant at any level 
of significance. The result shows that there is no association between the CSR disclosure 
quality and remuneration committee size.  The H8b hypothesis is therefore rejected.  
Furthermore, the coefficients of the CSR disclosure quantity (quality) on CEOD, BMET and 
AUDYPE are -.494 (-.002), .299 (-.003) and 1.911 (.009), respectively and they are not 
statistically significant at any level of significance. This result suggests that CSR disclosure 





In terms of firm characteristics, the study finds that the coefficient for CSRQuan on SIZE is 
3.351 and is statistically significant at 1% level of significance. This result indicates that a 
positive association exists between firm CSR disclosure quantity and firm size. In other 
words, the result suggests that the quantity of the CSR disclosure increases when the firm size 
increases. In addition, the coefficient of CSRQual on SIZE is .028 and is statistically 
significant at 5% level of significance. This result indicates that a positive association exists 
between firm CSR disclosure quality and firm size. In other words, the result suggests that 
the quality of CSR disclosure increases when the firm size increases. This results is consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Watson et al., 2002; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Tauringana and 
Mangena, 2009; Wang and Hussainey, 2013) who find that a positive relationship exists 
between firm size and disclosure of voluntary information. 
The study finds that the coefficient for CSRQuan on LEV is -.034 and is statistically 
significant at 5% level of significance. This result indicates that the CSR quantity is 
negatively associated with firm leverage, meaning that a negative association exists between 
firm CSR quantity and firm leverage. In other words, the result suggests that the quantity of 
the CSR disclosure increases when firm leverage decreases. Furthermore, the CSRQual on 
LEV is .000 and is statistically significant at 1% level of significance. This result indicates 
that CSR disclosure quality is positively associated with firm leverage. The results are 
consistent with some previous research on voluntary disclosure. For instance (e.g., 
Tauringana and Mangena, 2009; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2011; Boubaker et al., 2011) find 
a positive association between the disclosure of voluntary information and firm leverage. 
The study finds that the coefficient for CSRQuan on DIVI is -006 and is statistically 
significant at 1% level of significance. This result indicates that CSR quantity is negatively 
associated with dividends paid, suggesting that the quantity of the CSR disclosure increases 
when dividends paid are decreased.   The result is not consistent with some previous research 
on voluntary disclosure. For instance, Naser et al. 2006; Wang, and Hussainey, 2012; 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar 2011) find a positive association between the disclosure of 
voluntary information and dividends paid. 
Finally, the coefficients of CSR disclosure quantity (quality) on PROF and LIQ are -.060 (-
.001) and -.368 (-.003), respectively, and they are not statistically significant at any level of 
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significance. This result suggests that the CSR disclosure (quantity and quality) are not 
affected by firm profitability and firm liquidity.    
 Table (4): Regression Results: Determinates of CSR disclosure quantity and quality 



















Constant -35.848*** 9.035 -3.968 .000  -.083 .156 -.536 .593  
BSZE .826* .476 1.733 .085 1.751 .016* .008 1.959 .052 1.751 
INDTOR -.367 .417 -.881 .380 1.307 -.015** .007 -2.073 .040 1.307 
GOVWN -16.550** 6.558 -2.524 .013 2.335 -.168 .113 -1.489 .139 2.335 
MANOWR -1.777 4.981 -.357 .722 1.186 .233*** .086 2.713 .007 1.186 
CEOD 1.911 1.326 1.441 .152 1.213 -.002 .023 -.084 .933 1.213 
BMET .299 .290 1.030 .305 1.358 -.003 .005 -.509 .611 1.358 
ACSZE 1.617* .893 1.810 .072 2.062 .015 .015 1.000 .319 2.062 
REMUCOSZE -2.494*** .776 -3.216 .002 2.051 -.019 .013 -1.420 .158 2.051 
AUDYPE -.494 1.335 -.370 .712 1.246 .009 .023 .398 .691 1.246 
PROF -.060 .047 -1.279 .203 1.623 -.001 .001 -1.539 .126 1.623 
SIZE 3.351*** .707 4.740 .000 3.934 .028** .012 2.278 .024 3.934 
LIQ -.368 .531 -.692 .490 1.374 -.003 .009 -.327 .744 1.374 
LEV -.034** .013 -2.580 .011 2.325 .000* .000 -1.966 .051 2.325 
DIVI -006*** .000 2.840 .005 2.372 -008*** .000 2.741 .007 2.372 
Fixed effect  Year & Industry  Year & Industry  






   .162 
2.564*** 
F  Sig. .000 .001    .001 
Durbin-Watson 1.483 1.424    1.424 
Observation 171 171    171 
CSRQuan refers to the quantity of CSR disclosure; CSRQual is the quality of CSR disclosure;  BSZE is the total number of directors on the board; INDTO 
number of independent directors in the firm board of directors, GOVWN is the percentage of shares owned by government, MANOW is the aggregate 
percentage of shares held by major shareholders (with at least 3% ownership), CEOD  is a dummy variable, equals 1 if the chairman is the same person as the 
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CEO of the firm, 0 otherwise  BMET is the total number of board meetings during the year; ACSZE is the is the total number of directors in audit committee; 
REMCOSZE is the number of members of the  firm’s remuneration committee, AUDYPE is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is audited by one of 
the largest four audit firms and 0 otherwise, PROF is firm profitability, measured using returns on the assets ratio; SIZE is the firm size, measured using the 
value of total assets; LIQ is firm liquidity, measured using the current ratio (current assets / current liabilities); LEV is firm leverage, measured using the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets, DIVI is the total dividends paid to common shareholders. 
***, **, * indicate significance at .01, .05 & .1 level. 











6- CONCLUSION  
This is the first study that empirically investigates the CSR disclosure in Saudi Arabian firms 
distinguishing between the quantity and quality of CSR disclosure. The study aims to 
measure the quantity and quality of CSR disclosure and to identify the determinants of CSR 
disclosure quantity and quality. It uses a sample from Saudi Arabian non-financial listed 
firms over the period of 2013-2014. The study develops a CSR disclosure index to measure 
the CSR disclosure quantity and quality.  
This study finds that Saudi Arabian firms provide higher levels of CSR disclosure; however, 
the quality of this disclosure is low. In addition, it finds that the quantity of CSR disclosure is 
positively (negatively) associated with board size, (percentage of governmental ownership), 
size of the audit committee and (size of the remuneration committee). In contrast, the quality 
of the CSR disclosure is positively (negatively) associated with board size, (percentage of 
independent directors) and with the percentage of managerial ownership.   
The results of the current study suggest important implications for users of the annual reports 
from Saudi Arabian non-financial firms. The research focuses on the two important themes, 
which are CSR disclosure quantity and quality, and the corporate governance mechanism. 
Clearly, there is limited literature on those two issues, particularly in developing countries 
(e.g., Saudi Arabia). The study develops two measures for CSR disclosure quantity and 
quality, which are helpful for users to evaluate the practice of CSR disclosures from Saudi 
Arabian firms. In addition, these measures help to enhance the reporting practices of 
companies concerning CSR disclosure when they present them in their annual reports. It also 
provides useful information to a wide range of stakeholders, particularly to those who are in 
developing Islamic countries. 
However, the current study has some limitations, which have to be considered as potential 
avenues for future research. Firstly, the current study focuses on a cross sectional variation 
across firms ignoring the differences that may result in CSR disclosure because of the 
differences in the sectors. This is may be a crucial avenue for future research to analyse 
sectors separately. Secondly, this study focuses only on one country, which is Saudi Arabia. 
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Appendix1: CSR disclosure quantity index   
1. Employee 5. Environmental Issues 
Employee Data Environmental policy statement 
Training &Development 
Designing facilities harmonious with 
environment 
Employees Benefit Using recycling material 
Pension Sponsoring environmental activities 
Work place pollution 
2. Community Waste management 
Community investment Conservation of natural resources 
Contribution to national economy 6. Energy 
Education Disclosing the company energy policies 
Health and safety Conservation of energy 
Social Loan 
Disclosing increased energy efficiency of 
products 
Social activities support 
7. Other Disclosures regarding to Saudi 
environment  
Funding scholarship programs 
Charitable society for the holy Quran memorization 
holly 
Human rights Ongoing charity ( WAGFF)  
Charity & Donation Hajj donations  
volunteering Others  disclosure related to Sharia activities 
Establish non-profit project  
3. Products and Services  
Developing & innovating new products  
Products & services quality  
ISO & other awards  
Guidance campaigns  
4. Customer  
Information of commercial and marketing  
Meeting customer needs   
customer feedback  
Customer service  
Customer satisfaction  









Appendix 2: The index to measure of CSR disclosure quality index 
Relevance 
Question no Question Likert’s  Literature 
R1 To what extent does the 
company disclosed the 
CSR in the annual 
report? 
1 =  No disclose about CSR 
2- Disclosed of CSR information 
limited (boilerplate paragraph). 
3 = Disclosed for Forward-looking 
information. 
4 = Apart subsection of CSR. 
5 = Extensive information useful for 
making expectation. 
e.g. McDaniel et 
al., 2002; Jonas and 
Blanchet, 2000; 
Beest et al. 2009 
Chakroun and 
Hussainey, 2014 
R2 To what extent does the 
presence of non-
financial company in 
terms of business 
opportunities and to 
what extent contribute to 
the society and 
environment? 
1 = No non-financial information 
2 = Little non-financial information, 
no useful for forming expectations 
3 = Useful non-financial information 
4 = Useful financial information, 
helpful for developing expectations 
5 = Non-financial information 
presents additional information 
which helps developing expectations 




Beest et al. 2009 
Faithful representation 
F1 To what extent does the 
company, in the 
discussion of CSR in the 
annual report, highlight 
the positive events as 
well as the negative 
events? 
1 =  No positive & negative events, 
are mentioned 
2 = Negative events only mentioned 
in footnotes 
3 = Emphasize on positive events 
4 = Balance positive/negative events 
of CSR 
5 = Impact of positive/negative 
events of CSR is also explained  
  
e.g. Razaee, 2003; 
Cohen et al., 2004 
Chakroun and 
Hussainey, 2014; 
Beest et al. 2009  
F2 To what extent does the 
company provide more 
explain of CSR 
information? 
1 = No description of CSR 
2 = Information on CSR limited,  
3 = Apart subsection of CSR 
4 = Extra attention paid to 
information concerning CSR 
5 = Comprehensive description of 
CSR 




Beest et al. 2009 
Understandability 
U1 To what extent is the 
annual report presented 
of CSR in a well-
organized manner? 
1 = Very bad presentation ( no text 
of CSR)                                   
2 = Bad presentation ( text only)                                         
3 = Poor presentation  (text and  
graphs )                                              
4 = Good presentation ( text,  graphs 
and ratio ) 
5 = Very good presentation ( full 
paragraph with more descriptive ) 




Beest et al. 2009 
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U2 To what extent does the 
presence of graphs and 
tables clarifies the 
presented information of 
CSR? 
1 = No graphs 
2 = 1-5 graphs 
3 = 6-10 graphs 
4 = 11-15 graphs 
5 = > 15 
e.g. Jonas and 
Blanchet, 2000; 




C1 To what extent is the 
information of CSR in 
the annual report 
comparable to 
information provided by 
other organizations? 
1 = No comparability ( no 
paragraph)  
2 = Limited comparability ( one 
paragraph) 
3 = Moderate comparability  (two  
paragraph)                            
4 = Very much comparability  (two  
paragraph with numbering)       
5 = Very extensive comparability 
( more than above )                                                            





Beest et al. 2009 
 
C2 To what extent does the 
company presents 
financial index numbers 
of CSR and ratios in the 
annual report? 
1 = No ratios 
2 = 1-2 ratios 
3 = 3-5 ratios 
4 = 6-10 ratios 
5 = > 10 ratios 
e.g. Cleary, 1999; 
Chakroun and 
Hussainey, 2014; 
Beest et al. 2009 
 
Relevance 
Information is considered to be relevant when it has a high ability of making difference in 
many of the decisions taken by users "(. IASB, 2010, p. 17). IFRS progress that “Financial 
information is able to make a difference in decision-making. 
Faithful representation 
For information to be faithfully representative, it should be complete, natural, and free of 
material misstatement (IASB, 2010).  
Understandability 
The IASB (2010) define the understandability as understanding of knowledge regarding the 
quality of the information which enabled users to understand their meaning. IASB (2010) 
suggest that understandability is enhanced when information is classified, characterized and 
presented clearly and concisely. 
Comparability 
The Comparability is considered to be the quality of information that enables users to identify 
similarities in, and differences between, two sets of economic phenomena characteristic 
51 
 
(IASB, 2010). In addition, it helps users to identify the key trends and analyse the 
performance of the company over time (ASB, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
